Matches

What would a nuclear war look like? 

During the Cold War, this was a question posed by many people, from strategists at NORAD to script writers in Hollywood. Although variables exist, most predictions ended with some version of MAD -- Mutually Assured Destruction. The assumption was that if one of the nuclear powers attacked the other, the defender would simply unload, which would cause the other to unload, and the only creatures left alive to wax philosophic about the whole catastrophe would be the insects crawling beneath our feet.

Weirdly enough, this nihilistic assumption may have saved lives, because no one in charge really wanted any of that to happen. Wars are fought for various reasons, but no rational modern state, the argument went, would wage a war that would not only annihilate its enemies but also everybody else.

Looking back, then, it almost seemed like the Cold War had a kind of “kill switch” that would, in theory, at least, stop the go cart from actually driving into the barn.

With North Korea, though, no such kill switch seems to exist. After all, one thing that kept the United States and the Soviet Union from launching missiles at each other was the relative balance between their nuclear arsenals. One side may have had more ICBM’s, for example, but both sides had more than enough to destroy everything. I’ve used this quote from Carl Sagan in a column before, but it certainly bears repeating now:

“Imagine a room awash in gasoline, and there are two implacable enemies in that room. One of them has nine thousand matches. The other has seven thousand matches. Each of them is concerned about who's ahead, who's stronger…The amount of weapons that are available to the United States and the Soviet Union are so bloated, so grossly in excess of what's needed to dissuade the other, that if it weren't so tragic, it would be laughable. What is necessary is to reduce the matches and to clean up the gasoline.”

The metaphor now, though, is different. North Korea doesn’t have seven thousand matches, but yesterday it had two, today it has four, and tomorrow it will try to get eight. Regardless, it doesn’t take seven thousand matches to blow up a room filled with gasoline, anyway.

 It takes one.

So, seriously, what would an actual nuclear war look like?

Another quote from Sagan that is worth repeating at length, particularly in light of recent events, concerned his opinion on the supposed usefulness of the hydrogen bomb as peace keeper. Because of its shocking power, some scientists and policy makers believed the weapon would act as deterrent to nuclear holocaust. In his 1995 book The Demon Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark, Sagan discusses Edward Teller, the so-called “father” of the hydrogen bomb:

“Teller contended, not implausibly, that hydrogen bombs keep the peace, or at least prevent thermonuclear war, because the consequences of warfare between nuclear powers are now too dangerous. We haven't had a nuclear war yet, have we? But all such arguments assume that the nuclear-armed nations are and always will be, without exception, rational actors, and that bouts of anger and revenge and madness will never overtake their leaders (or military and secret police officers in charge of nuclear weapons). In the century of Hitler and Stalin, this seems ingenuous.”

We have finished with the century of Hitler and Stalin, of course.  Unfortunately, we now find ourselves living in a century also full of irrational actors, with Kim Jong Un taking center stage.

At this point, it may seem as if President Trump must choose between two terrible options:  attack North Korea preemptively, dismantling its nuclear capabilities as quickly as possible, which will likely result in retaliation and tremendous civilian death, or attack North Korea after it actually uses its weapons, an action that will certainly result in tremendous civilian casualties.  One might assume that Kim Jong Un’s survival instincts would kick in before this took place, as any military engagement with the United States would undoubtedly bring about the end of his regime.  Again, however, this assumes a nation-state led by rational actors.

For some policy makers, one supposedly rational actor that has not done enough acting in all of this is China, whom Trump believes should be embarrassed by North Korea’s antics the same way a parent might be when his kid picks up a football in the toy section of Wal-Mart and kicks it into Electronics.  Some even suggest that China could “solve” the North Korean problem unilaterally if it simply treated its neighbor with more “tough” and less “love.”  However, just as one might question how much influence a parent has over a football-kicking child, the same might be asked of China’s supposed power over its disastrous neighbor.

One final quote to consider, this one by Defense Secretary James Mattis in the wake of North Korea’s most recent nuclear tests, outlined the Trump Administration’s potential response to the dilemma:

“We made clear that we have the ability to defend ourselves and our allies, South Korea and Japan from any attack and our commitments among the allies are ironclad. Any threat to the United States and its territories including Guam or our allies will be met with a massive military response — a response both effective and overwhelming."

            So, what will a nuclear war actually look like?  If North Korea continues down this road, the guessing, perhaps among other pursuits, might be over.